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Highlights
• We develop a 2-period model where manufacturer and the third-party sell
durables.
• The third-party’s profitability is affected by degree of manufacturer’s up-
grading.
• We derive optimal conditions for manufacturer to release an upgraded
product.
• We derive optimal conditions for a third-party to enter a secondary mar-
ket.
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of manufacturers upgrading strategy of
durable products on the decision of third-party entrant in a secondary market.
To do so, we develop a two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer
sells new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while
a third-party entrant operates a reverse channel selling used products in the
secondary market. The manufacturer releases an upgraded product (i.e., one
that is technologically superior to the version introduced in the first period). We
derive conditions under which it is optimal (1) for the manufacture to release
an upgraded product in the second period and (2) for a third party entrant to
enter a secondary market. We also find, through numerical analysis, that when
upgrades are typically small or moderate, the upgrading of new products can
increase a third party entrant’s profitability in the secondary market but it does
not benefit the third party entrant when upgrades are typically large.
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1. Introduction
Upgrading is the process of replacing a product with a new higher qual-
ity version of the same product (e.g., one with a stronger function or higher
performance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Martin (2011); Anton and Biglaiser
(2013)). Frequent introduction of upgraded products has been recognized as5
an important means by which firms continuously renew themselves in order to
survive and prosper in a rapidly changing business environment (Koufteros and
Marcoulides (2006); Anton and Biglaiser (2013) )and is particularly noticeable
in durable goods industries. For example, a new mobile phone model is intro-
duced into the market with innovative agenda, camera, or Internet functions10
every month (Martin (2011)), while in the automobile industry, car makers in-
troduce new components with every new model yearly. Similar patterns can be
observed in other industries, including PCs, household appliances (e.g., wash-
ing machines, dryers, and vacuum cleaners), CRT devices (e.g., TV sets and
monitors), and consumer electronics (Anton and Biglaiser (2013)). At the same15
time, however, trading used products in secondary markets is also a common
practice in many durable goods industries (Hendel and Lizzeri (1999); Shulman
and Coughlan (2007); Yin et al. (2010); Schiraldi and Nava (2012); Shen and
Willems (2014)), including the used car and second-hand PCs, etc. As Com-
puter Business Review (2005) 1points out, these secondary markets have grown20
rapidly in recent years with third-party companies, for example, the PC indus-
try building$100+ million per year businesses in buying, selling, or leasing used
computer equipment.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of product upgrading on third party used
1Computer Business Review (2005). Big Players Emerge in Fragmented Brokerage Mar-
ket. Accessed September 5, http://www.cbronline.com/news/big players emerge in ragmented
brokerage market
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product retailer’s entrance decision to the secondary market. Because an up-25
graded product gives consumers a higher utility, it will prompt those consumers
who were planning to buy used products in the secondary markets to turn to the
new products market for higher quality or performance. In this case, product
upgrading will have a negative effect on the sales of used products, which will
reduce the entrance propensity of a third party retailer. On the other hand,30
consumers earn a higher net benefit from replacing a used with an upgraded
new product, so product upgrading will have a positive effect on the sales of
used products, by ensuring greater availability of used products, which obvi-
ously increase the entrance propensity. These observations raise an important
question that warrants theoretical analysis: whether the manufacturer upgrad-35
ing of new products actually affects the third party retailer’s entrance decision
to secondary market, and if so, how?
Yet the models used in previous research tend to ignore the effect of manu-
facturer’s upgrading decisions on the secondary market and consider only these
markets impacts on manufacturer’s new product introduction strategies (e.g.,40
Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Zhao and Jagpal (2006); Yin et al. (2010)). Hence,
in this paper, we focus on the effect of manufacturer’s upgrading of new products
on the sales of used products in the secondary market. To do so, we develop
a dynamic two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer sells new
durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, and a third-party45
entrant sells used products (i.e., those marketed in the first period) in the second
period through a secondary market that is not directly controlled by the man-
ufacturer. Our primary interest is in answering the following questions: Under
what conditions it is optimal for a durable goods manufacturer to upgrade new
products in the second period? What condition is needed for the third-party50
entrant to enter the secondary market in the second period? How does manufac-
turer upgrading degree affect the profits of channel partners? Hence our model
differs from those previous studies in that it simultaneously considers an active
secondary market, upgrading of new products, consumer market segmentation,
and especially, the upgrade degree of new products as a function of consumer55
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demand.
Our analysis reveals that when the investment cost of upgrading products is
low, manufacturers do have an incentive to release an upgraded version in the
second period, but when the investment cost is higher, they do not. Moreover,
although the degree of upgrade always has a negative effect on the price of60
new products in the first period, its effect on the price of both used and new
products in the second period is unimodal depending on intensity. We also find
that the third-party entrant is likely to engage in the secondary market when
the purchase cost of used products from former consumers is significantly low.
Most importantly, we show that the upgrading of new products can increase the65
third-party entrants secondary market profitability when upgrades are typically
minor or moderate but selling used products in the secondary market does not
benefit the third-party entrant when upgrades are typically major.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature and explains our contributions in more detail. Section 3 outlines the70
key elements of our model, as well as the derivation of the consumer demand
function. Section 4 describes the model framework, presents the optimal equi-
librium solutions for channel partners, and reports our main findings. Section
5 summarizes our conclusions and suggests opportunities for future research.
2. Relevant Literature75
Our paper is closely related to the broader literature on durable goods and
new product development strategies; particularly, those studies that address (1)
the dynamics between new and used products and (2) the interaction between
the secondary market and the introduction of upgrades in the durable goods
industry. The first stream of research, which is especially well established, in-80
cludes Levinthal and Purohit (1989); Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Shulman
and Coughlan (2007). Levinthal and Purohit (1989) examine the optimal sales
strategy for a monopolist marketing a durable product in an existing secondary
market. They show that not only limiting initial sales lowers new product can-
5
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nibalization but buying back the earlier version generates greater demand for85
the new product. Their model, however, assuming that prices are linear func-
tions of the cumulative quantities produced to date, does not allow nonbuyers
from the first period to purchase in the second period. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1998), in their analysis of firms dynamic pricing strategies in an existing sec-
ondary market, assumes that consumers in the market are homogeneous and90
the used market generates no profits for channel members. Based on heteroge-
neous consumers, Shulman and Coughlan (2007) show that the manufacturer
earns higher profits from allowing used-good sales alongside new-good sales
than from shutting down a retailer-profitable secondary market that expands
the manufacturers unit sales beyond what is possible when only the primary95
market exists. These studies, however, ignore the effect of the new products
upgrade on channel partners strategies. For further discussion of the relevant
issues, see Desai and Purohit (1998, 1999); Desai et al. (2004); Huang et al.
(2001); Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005); Chen et al. (2010); Xiong et al. (2012,
2013); Pangburn and Stavrulaki (2014).100
Our study is also related to the literature on the interaction between the
secondary market and the introduction of upgrades in durable goods market.
Zhao and Jagpal (2006), for instance, examine the effect of secondary markets for
durable goods on a firm’s dynamic pricing and new product introduction strate-
gies. They find that secondary markets have differentiating effects on pricing105
across industries depending on the magnitudes of the innovation (major, mod-
erate, or minor), and whether demand externalities are present. Martin (2011)
then examines strategic behavior in a durable goods oligopoly where there is a
positive probability of upgrade introduction. He argues that the presence of a
secondary market not only increases the range of upgrades that are profitable110
but also raises profitability for a given upgrade quantity because former cus-
tomers can be charged a higher price for the upgrade. Both studies, however,
assume that used products are sold in an isolated channel while in reality, re-
tailers sell used goods for profit in a co-opetition environment, for example, in
textbook markets used book sellers not only cooperate with the manufacturers115
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but are in competition with them. The presence of secondary market, therefore,
especially one that is not directly controlled by the new product manufacturer,
forces new product retailers or manufacturers to take used goods consumers
into account when making business decisions. On the other hand, Yin et al.
(2010), in their analysis of how the sequential emergence of retailer and P2P120
used goods markets shape both a manufacturers product upgrade strategy and
a primary market retailers pricing strategy, assume that the retailer sells both
used and new products for profit simultaneously. They find that frequent prod-
uct upgrades and rising retail prices in durable product sectors results from the
emergence of a P2P used goods market whose interaction with the retail used125
goods source alters the relative powers of the channel partners. In reaching this
conclusion, however, they assume an exogenous segmentation of consumers who
return used goods to the retail store or exchange them in P2P markets. For
additional insights on this topic, see Fishman and Rob (2000); Kornish (2001);
Lim and Tang (2006); Esteban and Shum (2007); Kogan (2011); Oraiopoulos130
et al. (2012).
Our paper differs from the extant literature in two ways: First, instead of ig-
noring the new product upgrade degree and paying little attention to its impact
on consumer segmentation (particularly, consumer utilities), we endogenize this
degree as a function of consumer demand (i.e., an endogenous segmentation of135
consumers). Second, rather than assuming that used goods are not sold through,
or are sold outside, the standard channel, which ignores the effect of upgraded
new product introduction in the secondary market, our dynamic model assumes
that used products are sold by a third-party entrant in a secondary market not
directly controlled by the manufacturer. In particular, we focus on the effect of140
manufacturer’s product upgrading on the third-party entrant’s decisions within
a two-period context. To do so, we make two assumptions: First, we assume that
consumers’ quality valuations are heterogeneous, so that used product markets
can be explicitly modeled. Second, to provide useful insights on third-party en-
trance into a secondary market, we assume the existence of an active secondary145
market that is not controlled by the manufacturer.
7
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Although a few models have been developed to investigate the existence of
new and used products of the same version in dynamic settings (e.g., Ferrer
and Swaminathan (2006); Huang et al. (2001); Erzurumlu (2010), they do not
capture the manufacturers upgrading strategies. Their focuses are either the150
competition between new and used products of the same version or how a fric-
tionless used goods market affects the price of new products. In contrast, we
consider the competition between new and used products of different versions
and examine the effect of the manufacturers product upgrading on the decisions
of third-party entrants in the secondary market. Our analytic results show that155
the upgrading degree of new products is critical to the profits of the channel
members.
3. Model Framework
In developing our framework, we consider a two-period model 2 in which a
monopolistic manufacturer (M) sells new durable products directly to end con-160
sumers in both periods, while a third-party entrant (TPE) sells reverse chan-
neled used products (i.e., cleaned and tested buybacks from former customers)
in a secondary market not directly controlled by the manufacturer (see Figure
1). We assume that all products provide only two periods of service (see, Desai
et al. (2004); Yin et al. (2010)): “new” in period 1 and “used” in period 2. As165
a result, only new products are available in period 1, but both new and used
products are available in period 2, which means the manufacturer’s new product
sales face competition from the used products offered by the TPE3.
Following Desai et al. (2004) and Shulman and Coughlan (2007), we assume
that all players in the model are rational and follow a Stackelberg game (see170
2This assumption is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Desai and Purohit (1998);
Desai et al. (2004); Xiong et al. (2012)), and a two-period model not only allows us to study
dynamic issues while retaining tractability but simplifies the presentation of our analysis.
3In reporting our analytic results, for convenience, we use the pronouns “he” and “she” to
refer to the manufacturer and third-party entrant, respectively.
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Figure 1: Two-Period Model Framework
Figure 2). In stage 1, period 1, the manufacturer decides whether or not to
introduce an upgraded version 4 of the product in period 2, since upgrade de-
cision is normally strategic and require significant lead time 5. If an upgrade is
introduced, it increases customer valuations of the new product in period 2 by
a factor of 1 + α, where α (the product upgrade degree) is greater than zero175
6. Such a decision, however, involves an investment by the manufacturer whose
amount depends on the upgrade degree.
Then, the manufacturer determines the unit price of the first-period new
products p1 in stage 2, period 1, and the unit price of the second-period new
products 7 p2 in stage 1, period 2. The TPE then decides the price of used180
4We label the new product in the first period the “original version.”
5Edition upgrades of college textbooks, for example, often take over a year, and the decision
to update is made years in advance (e.g., Friscia (2009); Yin et al. (2010)).
6This factor refers to the degree of quality differentiation between the original and up-
graded product versions. For instance, firms in the computer hardware industry continuously
introduce technological innovations that lead to improvements in, for example, memory and
speed.
7The version sold depends on the manufacturers decision in the first stage. Like Yin et al.
(2010), we assume that original and upgraded versions of the new produce are not marketed
simultaneously.
9
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whether or not the manufacturer decides to release an upgraded version in period 2.)
products pu in stage 2, period 2.
3.1. Product
To model the difference between new and used products, we designate the
durability of the products produced in period 1 by factor δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), which
represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up in period 2 (when it is185
classified as used). If δ = 1, the product is perfectly durable and shows no
deterioration over time, meaning that in period 2, used units are identical to
new units. If δ = 0, the product is nondurable and deteriorates fully after one
period of use. In this paper, we consider only 0 < δ < 1.
3.2. Manufacturer190
The manufacturer’s problem is to set upgrade degree and price pi so as to
maximize his profits. Here, i = 1, 2 denotes period 1 or 2. If the manufacturer
introduces an upgraded product in period 2, we denote it as α > 0; otherwise
α = 0 (i.e., the manufacturer sells the original product in period 2). We further
assume that if an upgraded version is introduced, it requires an investment cost195
for the manufacturer, the amount of which depends on the upgrade degree.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the manufacturer’s marginal cost of
production and selling to zero.
3.3. Third-Party Entrant
The TPE’s problem is to choose the price of used products pu in a way that200
maximizes her profits. Suppose that used products have a residual value for all
customers, the TPE occurs a reverse cost c from buying back used products for
10
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profitable resale. We also normalize the TPE’s marginal cost of reselling to zero
without loss of generality.
3.4. Consumer Strategies205
We first assume that the size of the consumer population does not change
over time and can be normalized to 1 and that no consumer can use more
than one unit of the product in any period. We can then derive the inverse
demand functions from the consumer utility functions. We do so by modeling
heterogeneous consumers using parameter θ to represent a consumers valuation210
of the services provided by a durable, which is distributed uniformly in the
interval [0, 1]. Consumer with type θ thus has a valuation of θ for a new product.
Recall that the durability of the product is δ, which represents how well a unit
sold in period 1 holds up as a used product in period 2, then consumer with type
θ has a valuation of δθ for one used product. We assume that no consumers sell215
their used products directly to each other.
In period 1, the consumer can either buy a new product or choose not to. In
period 2, consumers who bought a new product in period 1 can either replace it
with a new version from the manufacturer or continue using the same product
and abstain from the market at the end of period 2. On the other hand, con-220
sumers who did not buy a new product in period 1 can either buy a new or used
unit or remain inactive in period 2. Following the same procedure as Desai and
Purohit (1998); Desai et al. (2004); Oraiopoulos et al. (2012), we can then use
a consumer choice model to derive the consumer demand.
The consumer type space can be divided into five segments: (1) consumers225
who buy a new product in period 1 and then sell their used product and buy a
new product in period 2 (NN), (2) consumers who buy a new product in period 1
and continue using it in period 2 (NU), (3) consumers who do not buy in period
1 but buy a new product in period 2 (ON), (4) consumers who do not buy in
period 1 but buy a used product in period 2 (OU), and (5) consumers who230
do not buy in either period (OO). Like Oraiopoulos et al. (2012), we assume
that α < δ (i.e., 1 +α <1 + δ); otherwise, the one-period utility from the
11
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improved product would be larger than the combined first- and second-period
utility derived by the consumer from a first-period purchase (in which case, the
ON segment would grow rapidly at the expense of all other segments).235
Using the above analysis, we derive the total utility for every consumer
segment: (1) (NN): UNN = θ−p1+c+(1+α)θ−p2; (2) (NU): UNU = θ−p1+δθ;
(3) (ON): UON = (1 + α)θ − p2; (4) (OU): UOU = δθ − pu; and (5) (OO):
UOO = 0. In terms of consumer utility, if all five strategies are in equilibrium,
then each consumer segment values the product more (i.e., has a higher θ)240
than the next segment, so that NN valuation>NU valuation > ON valuation
> OU valuation > OO valuation (Desai et al. (2004). Solving for marginal
consumers, UNN = UNU , yields the location point θ1 =
p2−c
1+α−δ of the consumer
who is indifferent between an NN or NU strategy. we can similarly obtain point
θ2 =
p1−p2
δ−α for the consumer who has the same utility whether adopting an245
NU or ON strategy, point θ3 =
p2−pu
1+α−δ for the consumer who has the same
utility whether adopting an ON or OU strategy, and pint θ4 =
pu
δ
for the
consumer who has the same utility whether adopting an OU or OO strategy.
we therefore have qNN = 1−θ1 =
1+α−δ+c−p2
1+α−δ , qNU = θ1−θ2 =
p2−c
1+α−δ −
p1−p2
δ−α ,
qON = θ2− θ3 =
p1−p2
δ−α −
p2−pu
1+α−δ , qOU = θ3− θ4 =
p2−pu
1+α−δ −
pu
δ
, where qNN , qNU250
and qOU denote the size of each consumer segment, respectively.
Remark 1. (1) The second period quantities of new products (qNN + qON )
for the manufacturer increase in upgrade degree α, while the quantities of
used products (qOU ) for the TPE decrease in upgrade degree α.
(2) The second period quantities of new products (qNN+qON ) for the manufac-255
turer decrease in product durability δ, while the quantities of used products
(qOU ) for the TPE increase in product durability δ.
(3) The quantities for consumers (qNN ) who buy new products in both periods
increase in the reverse cost of used products c, while the quantities for
consumers (qNU ) who buy a new product in period 1 and continue using260
it in period 2 decrease in the reverse cost of used products c.
(4) The first period quantities of new products (qNN + qNU ) for the manufac-
12
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turer increase with product durability δ.
It is clear that consumer utility increases with upgrade degree: the higher
the upgrade degree of the new products in period 2, the greater the number265
of consumers who purchase a new product in period 1, want to sell their used
product and buy a new product in period 2, or who do not purchase a new
product in period 1, favor to buy a new one in period 2. Thus, the second-
period quantities of new products increase in the upgrade degree, but used
product quantities decrease. This reduction occurs for two reasons: First, as270
the upgrade degree increases, fewer consumers purchase a new product in period
1, preferring instead to buy an upgraded product in period 2. This choice shrinks
used product sales in period 2. Second, from the manufacturer’s point of view,
higher first-period sales generate higher first-period profits, but also result in a
greater quantity of used goods to compete with future new good sales, thereby275
he prefers to limit the production of first period products. That is, fewer used
products are available. Hence, overall, used products quantities decrease in the
upgrade degree.
The decrease in second-period quantities of new products as product dura-
bility increases also has two explanations: First, as product durability increases,280
more consumers who purchase a new product in period 1 prefer to continue us-
ing that product in period 2. This choice shrinks the market of consumers who
purchase a new product in the first period and then sell their used product and
buy a new product in period 2. Second, as product durability increases, fewer
consumers who do not purchase a new product in period 1 choose to buy a new285
product in period 2. Moreover, the higher the product durability, the higher
the utilities and thus the number of consumers who purchase no new product
in period 1 and buy a used product in period 2.
The higher the reverse cost of the used products (i.e., the higher the residual
value of used products for consumers), the greater the number of consumers who290
buy a new product in period 1 and then sell their used product and buy a new
product in period 2. This observation implies that fewer consumers who buy a
13
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new product in period 1 keep using it in period 2 because the higher residual
value of the used products increases their utilities.
Finally, the higher the product durability, the higher the utilities of con-295
sumers who buy a product in period 1, meaning that more consumers who want
to keep the product or sell it in the secondary market at its resale value in period
2 prefer to buy a new product in period 1. Hence, the first-period quantities of
new products increase with the increase of product durability.
4. Model Development300
As outlined previously, our model includes a monopolistic manufacturer who
sells his new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while in
period 2, a TPE sells reverse channeled used products in a secondary market not
directly controlled by the manufacturer. We now characterize the equilibrium
between the players involved with a focus on the following dimensions: Under305
what conditions it is optimal for the durable goods manufacturer to release an
upgraded version in the second period? What condition is needed for the TPE
to enter the secondary market in the second period? How does the upgrading
of new products affect the profits of the channel partners?
4.1. The TPE’s problem310
To ensure a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we follow a backward in-
duction method in which we first solve the third-party entrant’s optimization
problem under the assumption of rational consumer expectations. Denoting the
TPE’s profit by Πe, we formulate the TPE’s problem
8 as
MaxpuΠe(p1, p2, pu) = puqOU − cqNN = pu(
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
−
pu
δ
)− c(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
)
s.t.,0 < qOU ≤ qNN
(1)
8Obviously, when qOU = 0 in the second period (i.e., no secondary market exists), the
TPE is necessarily a nonparticipant. This case, however, is not the focus of our research.
14
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where the constraint qOU ≤ qNN ensures that the sales quantity of used products315
is not greater than the number of units that can be collected from consumers
and pu and c represent the price of used products and their reverse cost to the
TPE, respectively.
4.2. The manufacturer’s problem
The manufacturer’s problem is to maximize the total profit over the two320
periods with respect to p1, p2, taking into account the TPE’s best response and
the consumers’ two-period strategies. In order to obtain the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, we follow the method of backwards induction. We first solve
the manufacturer’s second period problem and then solve the first-period prob-
lem. Let Π1 and Π2 denote the manufacturer’s first-period and second-period325
profits, respectively.
4.2.1. The manufacturer’s second-period problem
The manufacturer’s second-period optimization problem can be expressed
as
Maxp2Π2(p1, p2, p
∗
u) = p2(qNN+qON ) = p2(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
+
p1 − p2
δ − α
−
p2 − p
∗
u
1 + α− δ
),
(2)
where p2 denotes the price of the new products in period 2, and the TPE’s best330
response p∗u is taken into account in the manufacturer’s decision.
4.2.2. The manufacturers first-period problem
In period 1, the manufacturer decides whether to introduce an upgraded
version of the new product in period 2. If he does so, the upgrade occurs
an investment cost. Suppose that the investment cost function is 12K[(1 +335
α)2 − 1]9, where K represents the manufacturer’s investment cost parameter,
9Such increasing convex cost functions are common in the literature on investing in im-
provements (e.g., Gurnani and Erkoc (2008); Esteban and Shum (2007)). Obviously, if no
upgraded version is released, then no investment is required.
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Table 1 Equlibrium Decisions for the Channel Partners in Model
TPE’s decison
p∗u =
δ(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+cδ[(δ−α)(5α−2δ+2)+3(1+δ)]
2[(1+α)(7δ−7α+1)−2δ(δ−α)][2(1+α)( 1
δ−α
+1)−δ]
Manufacturer’s decison
period 1: p∗1 =
(δ−α)[2(1+α)(2+c)−δ(δ−α)]
7(1+α)(δ−α)+(1+α)−2δ(δ−α)
period 2: p∗2 =
(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+c[(δ−α)(5α−2δ+2)+3(1+δ)]
[(δ−α)(7− 2δ1+α )+1][2(1+α)(
1
δ−α
+1)−δ]
Threshold value of K
K∗(α) =
2[Π(p∗1 |α>0)−Π(p
∗
1 |α=0)]
α(α+2)
where
Π(p∗1 |α>0) = p1(qNN + qNU ) + p2(qNN + qON ) = G(1−
GN(1+α)H
N(δ−α) ) +
(1+α)H2
2N(1+α−δ)(α−δ) ;
G = (δ−α)(4+4α+αδ+2cα−δ
2+2c)
1+7δ+9αδ−7α2−2δ2−6α
N = 2 + 2δ + 3αδ − 2α2 − δ2;
H = α2 −G(1 + α+ δ) + cα− 2αδ − δ + δ2 − cδ;
and, Π(p∗1 |α>0) equals to Π(p
∗
1 |α=0), when α = 0
the manufacturer’s first-period optimization problem is
Maxp1Π(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) = Π1(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)
= p1(qNN + qNU ) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)−
1
2
K[(1 + α)2 − 1],
(3)
where the first part is the manufacturer’s revenue in period 1, and the second
is his revenue in period 2, and the third is his investment cost when he releases
an upgraded version in the second period. The equilibrium decisions for the340
players are given in Table 1, in which the threshold value represents the cost
below which the manufacturer will release an upgraded version, otherwise he
will retain the old version (for a detailed technical analysis, see the Appendix
A).
In the following, we will analyze the impact of parameters on the equilibrium345
decisions. First, we look at how the price of used product pu change with respect
to the product durability, the reverse cost of used products and the new product
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upgrade degree. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The price of used products pu increases in product durability
δ and the reverse cost of used products c but is unimodal (first increasing, then350
decreasing) in the new product upgrade degree α.
The role of product durability is two-fold. On the one hand, higher durability
expands the market segment that chooses to continue using the product and
shrinks the segment of consumers who decide to sell their used products and
buy new ones in the second period. The result is a higher procurement cost355
for the TPE, which reduces product viability and thus product quantity. On
the other hand, increased product durability increases the demand for used
products in the second period (see Remark 1 (2)). The TPE can therefore
charge consumers a higher price for used products in the secondary market.
As the reverse cost of used products increases (i.e., a higher residual value of360
used products for consumers), more consumers prefer to continue using their
original products in period 2, making it more difficult for the TPE to reverse
channel used products. As a result, the TPE charges a higher price for the
used products in the secondary market. The price of used products is unimodal
in the new product upgrade degree because this degree has two effects on the365
used product price: First (effect A), the higher the new product upgrade degree
in the second period, the higher the utilities of consumers who do not buy in
the first period but buy a new product in the second period. Hence, a higher
upgrade degree makes the second-period new product more competitive at the
expense of the used product, meaning that its price increases as the update370
degree increases. Conversely (effect B), as the upgrade degree increases, the
utilities that first period consumers obtain from selling their used products to
the TPE and buying a new one in the second period increase, so the TPE can
procure used products more cheaply, which has a positive effect on the quantity
of used products. As a result, the impact of new product upgrade degree on375
the used product price depends on the balance of the two effects. The used
product price decreases with the new product upgrade degree when the effect
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B is dominating, otherwise, the used product price increases with the upgrade
degree.
Next, we analyze the properties of the manufacturer’s new product price,380
which is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal prices of the manufacturer’s new product have the
following properties:
(1) the optimal prices of new products in both the first and second periods in-
crease with the reverse cost of used products c;385
(2) the optimal price of new products in the first period decreases with the new
product upgrade degree α;
(3) the optimal price of new products in the second period is unimodal in the
new product upgrade degree α.
The property (1) is straightforward. Because the higher the reverse cost of390
used products, the higher the residual value of used products (i.e., the higher
the quality of new products in period 1), the optimal price of new products in
the first period increases as the reverse cost of used products increases. The
manufacturer can then charge consumers a higher price for new products in
period 1. On the other hand, a higher price for new products in period 1 results395
in a lower sales volume for new products in period 1, leading to a lower reverse
volume of used products for the TPE in period 2. This reduction implies that
in period 2, the TPE faces strong competition from new products from which
the manufacturer can benefit by charging consumers a higher price for new
products.400
As the new product upgrade degree increases, both consumers who buy a
new product in period 1 sell it at the end of period 1, and buy a new product
in period 2 and consumers who do not buy in period 1 but buy a new product
in period 2 enjoy an increase in utilities. Therefore, the second-period new
products can become more competitive, meaning that the manufacturer always405
has higher incentive to charge a lower price for new products in period 1 in order
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to expand the new product market segment in period 2. This effect is driven
by two opposing forces. On the one hand (effect C), a higher upgrade degree
makes the second-period new products more competitive, so the manufacturer
can charge a higher price for them in period 2; on the other (effect D), as the410
upgrade degree increases, the TPE’s procurement cost decreases, which has a
positive effect on the quantity of used products. The latter, however, also leads
to greater cannibalization of new products, which lowers the new product price
in period 2. When the upgrade degree is low, effect C dominates effect D and a
higher upgrade degree leads to an increase in second-period new product prices.415
Now, we move to the TPE’s decision, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (1) If the manufacturer releases an upgraded version in the
second period, there is a threshold value c,
c = δ(δ−α)(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]4(1+α)2(1+δ−α)(7δ−7α+1)+δ(δ−α)[(δ−α)(6δ−27α−27)−13(1+α)]
such that when 0 < c < c, the TPE will choose to enter the secondary420
market; otherwise, when c ≥ c, she will choose to withdraw.
(2) Because upgrading new products increases the range of the TPE’s reverse
costs (i.e., expands her survival space in the secondary market), the prod-
uct upgrade in the second period benefits a TPE engaged in the secondary
market. When upgrades are major, however, no such benefit accrues.425
This proposition shows that the TPE chooses to enter the secondary market
when 0 < c < c because the optimal price of used products is greater than her
investment cost (i.e., p∗u > c), which makes it profitable to sell used products.
If c ≥ c, however, the optimal price of used products is less than or equal to
the TPE’s investment cost (i.e., p∗u ≤ c), so her engagement in the secondary430
market is not profitable, which implies that the manufacturer can weaken his
secondary market by improving the procurement cost of used products. For
example, Cisco requires each buyer of its refurbished equipment to pay high
relicensing fees for the proprietary software that runs on the equipment. This
practice, in effect, creates a higher procurement cost for the TPE and eliminates435
the secondary market (Oraiopoulos et al. (2012). Likewise, Sun Microsystems,
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Figure 3: Changing Trends in Reverse Costs
an IT server business, has deliberately attempted to eliminate the secondary
market for its machines worldwide through its pricing and licensing schemes
(Marion (2004)).
Based on the proof given in the Appendix C, we can see that as the upgrade440
degree increases, the threshold value of the TPE’s reverse cost first increases
and then decreases. We depict the intuition underlying proposition 3 (2) in
Figure 3 (i.e., δ = 0.9), which displays the range of the TPEs reverse cost.
Here, a lower upgrade degree implies no significant difference between the
upgraded and original versions, meaning that more consumers who buy a new445
product in the first period prefer to continue using it in the second period.
This preference in turn leads to an increase in the TPE’s reverse cost of used
products. However, as the upgrade degree increases, more consumers who buy
a new product in the first period prefer to sell their used product to the TPE
at the end of period 1 and buy a new product in period 2, thereby reducing the450
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TPE’s procurement cost. Moreover, when the upgrade degree is greater than
a certain value, manufacturer’s upgrading of new products does not benefit a
TPE in the secondary market except in industries where upgrades are typically
minor or moderate (in which case, upgrading expands her survival space).
4.2.3. The manufacturer’s product upgrade problem455
Whether a manufacturer decides to release an upgraded new product in
period 2 depends on whether doing so is more profitable than continuing to
sell the original version product; that is, Π(p∗1 |α>0) > Π(p
∗
1 |α=0). We thus
compare total two-period profits in two cases: (1) the manufacturer releases an
original version in the first period but an upgraded version in the second period460
and (2) the manufacturer sells the original version in both periods. We draw
the following conclusion:
Proposition 4. For the monopolistic manufacturer, there exists a threshold
value for manufacturer’s investment cost parameter K denoted as K∗(α)
K∗(α) =
2[Π(p∗1 |α>0)−Π(p
∗
1 |α>0)]
α(α+ 2)
,
Π = p1(qNN + qNU ) + p2(qNN + qON ),
Π(p∗1 |α>0)equals toΠ(p
∗
1 |α=0),when α = 0.
such that if K < K∗(α), the manufacturer will release an upgraded version465
product in period 2, but if K ≥ K∗(α), he will keep selling the original version.
Proposition4 suggests that the manufacturer should use two different intro-
duction strategies depending on the investment cost parameter of upgrading
new products. When the investment cost parameter is small (K < K∗(α)), the
manufacturer should release an upgraded version in the second period because a470
higher upgrade degree increases the competitiveness of second-period new prod-
ucts, a benefit that outweighs the potentially negative cannibalization effect of
used products. When the investment cost parameter is large (K ≥ K∗(α)),
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Figure 4: Threshold Values of the Manufacturers Investment Cost
however, the manufacturer should continue selling the original version in the
second period.475
We then let δ = 0.9, c = 0.005 and numerically illustrate the change of
threshold values of the manufacturers investment cost in upgrade degree(see
Figure 4). Figure 4 shows a marked decrease of the threshold value in the
upgrade degree α. This observation implies that although the manufacturer
may prefer to release an upgraded product in period 2, the decrease in the480
threshold value of investment cost parameters limits his upgrade ability and
makes upgrading extremely difficult when the upgrade degree is very large.
Hence, the manufacturer must find a balance between the upgrade degree and
investment cost.
Having identified the optimal strategies for the manufacturer and TPE with485
new product upgrade, we now gauge the extent to which upgrading impacts the
profitability of both the manufacturer and TPE. The highly nonlinear equations
22
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
Figure 5: Manufacturers Profits
make analytical comparison difficult. We, therefore, illustrate the impact of
upgrading on profits in a series of detailed numerical examples.
Using the same parameters as in the previous examples (δ = 0.9, c = 0.005)490
and let K = 0.005 (we also explored other parameter combinations in their
domains, and got similar results), we plot the changing of manufacturer’s profit
with the increasing of upgrade degree, which is presented in Figure 5. From
Figure 5, we have the following observation.
Observation 1. When an upgraded product is released in the second period,495
the manufacturer’s profit first increases and then decreases in the new product
upgrade degree α.
According to proposition 4, if the investment cost is feasible for the manu-
facturer, he prefers to release an upgraded product in the second period. Here,
Π(α > 0) represents the total two-period profit of the manufacturer who intro-500
duces an upgraded product in period 2, while Π(α = 0) represents that of the
manufacturer who sells the same version during both periods. It is apparent
from the figure that the manufacturers profit from releasing an upgraded prod-
uct in period 2 is greater than his profit from selling the original version when
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α ∈ (0, 0.763). Furthermore, this profit first increases and then decreases in the505
upgrade degree. This effect of the upgrade degree on the manufacturers total
two-period profit is a result of two phenomena: On the one hand (effect E), the
higher the new product upgrade degree in period 2, the higher the utilities of
those consumers who buy a new product in period 1 then sell their used product
and buy a new product in period 2, as well as of those who do not buy in the510
first period but buy a new product in the second period. These choices result
in a higher sales volume for the second-period new product, which increases
the manufacturer’s profit. On the other hand (effect F), as α increases, the
utilities that the first-period consumers obtain from selling their used products
to the TPE and buying a new one in the second period also increase, which515
lowers the TPE’s procurement cost for used products. In other words, the sales
of used products in the second-period market increase. Nevertheless, because
used products cannibalize new products in period 2, the competition from used
products becomes stronger, which has a negative effect on the manufacturer’s
profits. Thus, when the value is low, effect E dominates effect F and the man-520
ufacturers profit increases in the upgrade degree, but when value is high, his
profit decreases.
Again using the same parameters as in previous examples (δ = 0.9, c =
0.005,K = 0.005), we plot the changing of TPE’s profits as the upgrade degree
increases, which is depicted in Figure 6. From Figure 6, we have the following525
observation.
Observation 2. The manufacturer’s release of an upgraded product in the sec-
ond period benefits a TPE in the secondary market, whose profit first increases
and then decreases in the new product upgrade degree.
Here, Πe represents the TPE’s profit when the manufacturer releases an up-530
graded product in period 2. As in the analysis of manufacturer profit, we
find that the TPE’s profit first increases (α ∈ (0, 0.331)) and then decreases
(α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) as the upgrade degree increases. This effect is also driven
by two opposing forces. On the one hand (effect G), as α increases, the sales of
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Figure 6: TPE Profits
used products in the second period increase, which leads to an increase in the535
TPE’s profit. On the other hand (effect H), a higher α makes second-period
new products more competitive at the expense of used products, so the TPE’s
profit decreases in the upgrade degree. When effect G dominates effect H, the
TPE’s profit increases, otherwise, it decreases. Once again, the manufacturer’s
second-period upgrading of new products benefits the TPE when the upgrade540
is minor (α ∈ (0, 0.331)) or moderate (α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) but not when it is
major (α ≥ 0.769)).
5. Conclusion
Although the durable product literature has long studied the effect of sec-
ondary markets on manufacturers strategies in the primary market, most re-545
search assumes either the secondary market is a perfect market or used products
are sold outside the standard channel 10. It thus ignores the effect of introducing
upgraded new products on the TPE’s entrance decision to secondary market.
10See Levinthal and Purohit (1989); Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Zhao and Jagpal (2006)
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We, in contrast, examine how a manufacturers upgrade strategies in the durable
goods market affect the TPE’s entrance decision to secondary market. We con-550
sider several factors simultaneously in our model: an active secondary market,
upgrading of new products, consumer market segmentation, and most especially,
the upgrade degree of new products as a function of consumer demand.
To focus on the effect of introducing upgraded new products on the secondary
market, we developed a dynamic two-period model in which a monopolistic555
manufacturer sells his new durable products directly to end consumers in both
periods, while in the second period, a TPE sells reverse channeled used products
in a secondary market not directly controlled by the manufacturer. We derive
the condition under which manufacturer’s upgrading benefits a TPE. We also
identify an investment cost threshold below which the manufacturer’s optimal560
strategy is to release an upgraded version product in the second period. We
generate managerial insights into how manufacturer upgrading of new products
impact the decision of the TPE in the secondary market by characterizing the
optimal strategies of both parties. We find that manufacturer’s upgrading of
new products can increase a third-party entrant’s profitability in a secondary565
market when upgrades are typically small or moderate. It does not, however,
benefit the TPE engaged in selling used products when upgrades are typically
large.
The findings reported here suggest two obvious possibilities for further re-
search. First, our model could be extended to a recovery market, a typical570
assumption in the durable product literature, which would raise such additional
issues as how different recovery channels of used products affect the strategies
of the manufacturers product upgrade. Likewise, extending the model to an
oligopoly market would raise new and interesting questions; especially, whether
and how a firm should discriminate between its own former customers and those575
of its rivals.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Equilibrium Decisions for the Channel Partners in Model
The TPE’s optimization problem is
MaxpuΠe(p1, p2, pu) = puqOU − cqNN
= pu(
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
−
pu
δ
)− c(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
),
s.t.,0 < qOU ≤ qNN
(A.1)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Sub-700
stituting these segment sizes into the TPE’s objective function, we find that
∂2MaxpuΠe
∂p2u
< 0.Therefore, the profit function of the TPE is concave in pu. The
Lagrangian for the TPE’s problem is
Le(pu, λ1) = pu(
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
−
pu
δ
)−c(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
)+λ1(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
−
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
+
pu
δ
)
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and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:
∂Le(pu, λ1)
∂pu
= pu(
−1
1 + α− δ
−
1
δ
) +
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
−
pu
δ
+ λ1(
1
1 + α− δ
+
1
δ
) = 0;
λ1(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
−
p2 − pu
1 + α− δ
+
pu
δ
) = 0;
0 < qOU ≤qNN .
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrangean multiplier705
λ1 is greater than or equats to zero.
Case TPE-a: λ1 = 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we
have that p∗u =
δp2
2(1+α) . Meanwhile, the constraint 0 < qOU ≤ qNN leads to
0 < p2 ≤
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 . Therefore, the TPE will choose p
∗
u =
δp2
2(1+α) , when
0 < p2 ≤
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 .710
Case TPE-b: λ1 > 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we have
that p∗u =
δ(2p2+δ−c−1−α)
1+α , λ1 =
δ(3p2+2δ−2c−2−2α)
1+α . In addition the Lagrangian
multiplier λ1 > 0 leads to p2 >
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 Meanwhile, from the utility function,
we know that p2 < 1 + α + c − δ. Therefore, we obtain
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 < p2 <
1 + α+ c− δ.715
We now consider the price of new products in the second period under the
Case TPE-a. Note that we denote this case in Case M2-a. Replacing the values
p∗u =
δp2
2(1+α) and the constraint 0 < p2 ≤
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 of the Case TPE-a, we
obtain the manufacturer’s second period problem is
Maxp2Π2(p1, p2, p
∗
u) = p2(qNN + qON )
= p2(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
+
p1 − p2
δ − α
−
p2 − p
∗
u
1 + α− δ
)
s.t.,0 < p2 <
2(1 + α+ c− δ)
3
,
(A.2)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Sub-720
stituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s second-period problem,
we find that
∂2Maxp2Π2
∂p22
< 0. Therefore, the profit function of the manufac-
turer’s second-period is concave in p2. The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s
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second-period problem is
Le(pu, λ1) = p2(qNN+qON ) = p2(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
+
p1 − p2
δ − α
−
p2 − p
∗
u
1 + α− δ
)−λ2(p2−
2(1 + α+ c− δ)
3
)
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:725
∂L2(p2, λ2)
∂p2
= 1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
+
p1 − p2
δ − α
−
p2[2(1 + α)− δ]
2(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)
+ p2[−
1
1 + α− δ
−
1
δ − α
−
2(1 + α)− δ
2(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)
]− λ2 = 0;
λ2(p2 −
2(1 + α+ c− δ)
3
) = 0;
0 < p2 <
2(1 + α− c− δ)
3
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrange multiplier λ2
is greater than or equals to zero.
Case M2-a-1: λ2 = 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we
have that p∗2 =
(1+α)[(δ−α)(1+α+c−δ)+p1(1+α−δ)]
2(1+α)+(δ−α)[2(1+α)−δ] . In addition, the constraint
0 < p2 <
2(1+α−c−δ)
3 of the manufacturer’s second period problem leads to730
0 < p1 <
(1+α+c−δ)
3(1+α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1+α )].
Case M2-a-2: λ2 > 0. Solving the system, we have that p
∗
2 =
2(1+α+c−δ)
3
and λ2 =
[2(δ−α)δ−(1+α)(4+δ−α)](1+α−δ+c)+3p1(1+α)(1+α−δ)
3(1+α)(δ−α)(1+α−δ) . Moreover, Lagrange
multiplier λ2 > 0 leads to p1 >
(1+α+c−δ)
3(1+α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1+α )].
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the second period under735
the Case TPE-b. Note that we denote this case in Case M2-b. Replacing the
values p∗u =
δ(2p2+δ−c−1−α)
1+α and the constraint of the case TPE-b, we obtain
that the manufacturer’s second period problem is
Maxp2Π2(p1, p2, p
∗
u) = p2(qNN + qON ) = p2(1−
p2 − c
1 + α− δ
+
p1 − p2
δ − α
−
p2 − p
∗
u
1 + α− δ
)
s.t.,
2(1 + α+ c− δ)
3
< p2 < 1 + α+ c− δ.
(A.3)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Sub-
stituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s second-period problem,740
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we find that
∂2Maxp2Π2
∂p22
< 0. Therefore, the profit function of the manufac-
turer’s second period is concave in p2. Solving the first derivative of the prob-
lem, we have p∗2 =
(1+α)(δ−α)(1+α+c−δ)+p1(1+α−δ)
2(1+α−δ)(1+2δ−α) . In addition, the constraint
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 < p2 < 1+α+ c− δ leads to
(1+α+c−δ)[(1+α)(4+5δ−α)−4δ(1+2δ−α)]
3(1+α)(1+α−δ) <
p1 < (1 + α+ c− δ)
[(1+α)(2+3δ−α)−2δ(1+2δ−α)]
(1+α)(1+α−δ) .745
Now we consider the price of new products in the first period under the
Case M2-a-1. Note that we denote this case as Case M1-a-1. Replacing the
values p∗2 =
(1+α)[(δ−α)(1+α+c−δ)+p1(1+α−δ)]
2(1+α)+(δ−α)[2(1+α)−δ] and the constraint in Case M2-a-1,
we obtain that the manufacturer’s firs period problem is
Maxp1Π(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) = Π1(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)
= p1(qNN + qNU ) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)−
1
2
K[(1 + α)2 − 1],
s.t.,0 < p1 <
(1 + α+ c− δ)
3(1 + α− δ)
[4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1 + α
)].
(A.4)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Substi-750
tuting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s first-period problem, we find
that
∂2Maxp1Π1
∂p21
< 0. Therefore, the profit function is concave in p1.
The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s first-period problem is
L1(p1, λ3) =p1(1−
p1 − p
∗
2
δ − α
+ p∗2(1−
p∗2 − c
1 + α− δ
) +
p1 − p
∗
2
δ − α
−
p∗2 − p
∗
u
1 + α− δ
)
−
1
2
K[(1 + α)2 − 1]− λ3(p1 −
(1 + α+ c− δ)
3(1 + α− δ)
[4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1 + α
)])
(A.5)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:
∂L1(p1, λ3)
∂p1
=1−
2p1
δ − α
+
2(1 + α)[(δ − α)(1 + α− δ) + c(δ − α) + p1(1 + α− δ)] + p1(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)
(δ − α)[2(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)− δ(δ − α)]
− λ3 = 0;
λ3(p1 −
(1 + α+ c− δ)
3(1 + α− δ)
[4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1 + α
)]) = 0;
0 < p1 <
(1 + α+ c− δ)
3(1 + α− δ)
[4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1 + α
)].
We consider two sub-cases according to whether the Lagrangian multiplier755
λ3 is greater than or equals to zero.
Case M1-a-1: λ3 = 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we have
that p∗1 =
(δ−α)[2(1+α)(2+c)−δ(δ−α)]
7(1+α)(δ−α)+(1+α)−2δ(δ−α) . Moreover, p
∗
1 such that the constraint
0 < p1 <
(1+α+c−δ)
3(1+α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1+α )].
Case M1-a-2: λ3 > 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we have760
that p1 =
(1+α+c−δ)
3(1+α−δ) [4+ (δ−α)(1−
2δ
1+α )] and λ3 = 1−2(1+α+ c− δ)(4+(δ−
α)(1−2δ/(1+α)))/(3+3α−3−δ)/(δ−α)+((2+2α)((δ−α)(1+α−δ)+c(δ−α)+
(1+α+c−δ)(4+(δ−α)(1−2δ/(1+α)))/(3+3α−3−δ)(1+α−δ))+(1+α)(1+
α− δ)(4+ (δ−α)(1− 2δ/(1+α)))/(3+3α− 3δ)/(2+2α+(δ−α)(2+2α− δ)).
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the first period under765
the Case M2-a-2. Note that we denote this case as Case M1-a-2. Replacing the
values p∗2 =
2(1+α+c−δ)
3 and the constraint in Case M2-a-2, we obtain that the
manufacturer’s first period problem is
Maxp1Π(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) = Π1(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)
= p1(qNN + qNU ) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)−
1
2
K[(1 + α)2 − 1],
s.t.,p1 >
(1 + α+ c− δ)
3(1 + α− δ)
[4 + (δ − α)(1−
2δ
1 + α
)].
(A.6)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Substi-
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tuting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s first-period problem, we find770
that
∂2Maxp1Π1
∂p21
< 0. Therefore, the profit function is concave in p1. Solving
the first order derivative of the manufacturer’s first-period problem, we have
that p∗1 =
4(1+c)+α−δ
6 . It can be shown that p
∗
1 does not satisfy the constraint.
Therefore, this case will never occur in equilibrium.
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the first period Case M2-b.775
We denote this case as Case M1-b. Substituting the value p∗2 =
(1+α)[(δ−α)(1+α+c−δ)+p1(1+α−δ)]
2(1+α−δ)(1+2δ−α)
and the constraint in Case M2-b, we obtain that the manufacturer’s first period
problem is
Maxp1Π(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) = Π1(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)
= p1(qNN + qNU ) + Π
∗
2(p1, p
∗
2, p
∗
u)−
1
2
K[(1 + α)2 − 1],
s.t., p1 >
(1 + α+ c− δ)[(1 + α)(4 + 5δ − α)− 4δ(1 + 2δ − α)]
3(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)
p1 < (1 + α+ c− δ)
(1 + α)(2 + 3δ − α)− 2δ(1 + 2δ − α)
(1 + α)(1 + α− δ)
.
(A.7)
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Substi-
tuting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s first-period problem, we find780
that
∂2Maxp1Π1
∂p21
< 0. Therefore, the profit function is concave in p1. Solving the
first order derivative of the manufacturer’s first-period problem, we have that
p∗1 =
2(δ−α)(2+δ+c)
1+8δ−7α . It can be shown that p
∗
! does not satisfy the constraint.
Based on the above analysis, we obtain the optimal price of new products in
period 1 is p∗1 =
(δ−α)[2(1+α)(2+c)−δ(δ−α)])
7(1+α)(δ−α)+1+α)−2δ(δ−α) . Substituting p
∗
1 into p
∗
2, p
∗
u, we get785
p∗2 =
(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+c[(δ−α)(5α−2δ+2)+3(1+α)]
[(δ−α)(7− 2δ1+α )+1][2(1+α)(
1
δ−α
+1)−δ]
p∗u =
δ(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+cδ[(δ−α)(5α−2δ+2)+3(1+δ)]
2[(1+α)(7δ−7α+1)−2δ(δ−α)][2δ(δ−α)][2(1+α)( 1
δ−α
+1)−δ]
.
Therefore, the equilibrium decisions for the channel partners are given in Table
1.
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1790
It is obvious that the price of used products increases in the residual value c.
For the sign of ∂pu
∂δ
, we have ∂pu
∂δ
=
f2
∂f1
∂δ
−f1
∂f2
∂δ
4[(7δ−7α+1)(1+α)−2δ(δ−α)]2[2(1+α)(1+ 1
δ−α
)−δ]2
,
where f1 = δ(1 + α− δ)[(1 + α)(7δ− 7α+ 5)− 3δ(δ− α)] + cδ(5δ− 2α+ 7αδ−
5α2 − 2δ2 + 3), f2 = 2[(1 + α)(7δ− 7α+ 1)− 2δ(δ− α)][2(1 + α)(1 +
1
δ−α )− δ].
Therefore, to show that ∂pu
∂δ
> 0, it is sufficient to show that f2
∂f1
∂δ
− f1
∂f2
∂δ
> 0.795
Simple calculation can give the result.
Finally
∂pu
∂α
=
f2
∂f1
∂α
− f1
∂f2
∂α
4[(7δ − 7α+ 1)(1 + α)− 2δ(δ − α)]2[2(1 + α)(1 + 1
δ−α )− δ]
2
,
thus, the sign of ∂pu
∂α
is determined by the sign of the numerator. Since f2
∂f1
∂α
−
f1
∂f2
∂α
= (δ((1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α))+δ(1+α−δ)(10δ−14α−2)+cδ(−2+
7δ−10α))((2+2α)(7δ−−7α+1)−4δ(δ−α))((2+2α)(1+1/(δ−α))−δ)−((18δ−800
28α−12)((2+2α)(1+1/(δ−α)((1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α))+ cδ(5δ−2α+
7αδ − 5α2 − 2δ2 + 3 and α < δ. Using extensive numerical analysis by taking
values in the whole domain, we can show that f2
∂f1
∂α
−f1
∂f2
∂α
is first positive and
then negative as α increases. Namely, the price of used products first increases
in the upgraded degree, and then decreases in the upgraded degree.805
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
(i) This result is obvious.
(ii)For the sign of
∂p∗1
∂δ
, we have,
∂p∗1
∂δ
= (−4−8α−2c−2αδ−4α2+2δ2−2α2δ+
2αδ2− 4cα− 2cα2+5α2δ2− 10αδ3+8cαδ2− 4cα2δ+5δ4− 4cδ3)/(−7δ+6α−
1− 9αδ + 7α2 + 2δ2))2. Note that α < δ, so
∂p∗1
∂δ
< 0.810
(iii) Omitted, please refer to the proof of Proposition 1 (iii).
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
To show that p∗u−c > 0, i.e., p
∗
u−c =
δ(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+cδ(5δ−2α+7αδ−5α2−2δ2+3)
2[(7δ−7α+1)(1+α)−2δ(δ−α)][2(1+α)(1+ 1
δ−α)
−δ]
−
c > 0, it is sufficient to show that δ(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)]+
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cδ(5δ−2α+7αδ−5α2−2δ2+3)−2c[(7δ−7α+1)(1+α)−2δ(δ−α)][2(1+α)(1+815
1
δ−α)−δ] > 0. That is, c[[14(δ−α)(1+α)+2(1+α)−4δ(δ−α)][2
1+α
δ−α+2(1+α)−
δ]−δ(5δ−2α+7αδ−5α2−2δ2+3)] < δ(1+α−δ)[(1+α)(7δ−7α+5)−3δ(δ−α)].
Thus,
c <
δ(δ − α)(1 + α− δ)[(1 + α)(7δ − 7α+ 5)− 3δ(δ − α)]
4(1 + α)2(1 + δ − α)(7δ − 7α+ 1) + δ(δ − α)[(δ − α)(6δ − 27α− 27)− 13(1 + α)]
.
Appendix E. Proof of Propositon 4820
If the manufacturer decides to release a new upgraded product in period 2,
the profit of releasing a new upgraded product must larger than the profit of
selling the original version products in period 2, i.e., Π(p∗1 | α > 0) > Π(p
∗
1 |
α = 0). On the other hand, from the function of manufacturer’s optimization
problem, it is clear that the profit of the manufacturer Π(p1) decreases linearly825
in K. Therefore, in order to obtain the threshold value K∗(α), we need to let
Π(p∗1 | α > 0) = Π(p
∗
1 | α = 0). That is, Π(p
∗
1 | α > 0) −
1
2K[(1 + α)
2 − 1] =
Π(p∗1 | α = 0), where Π = p1(qNN +qNU )+p2(qNN +qON ). Thus, the threshold
value K∗(α) =
2[Π(p∗1 |α>0)−Π(p
∗
1 |α=0)]
α(α+2) , and Π(p
∗
1 | α > 0) = G(1−
GN+(1+α)H
N(δ−α) )+
(1+α)H2
2N(1+α−δ)(α−δ) ;830
G = (δ−α)(4+4α+αδ+2cα−δ
2+2c)
1+7δ+9αδ−7α2−2δ2−6α .
N = 2 + 2δ + 3αδ − 2α2 − δ2;
H = α2 −G(1 + α− δ) + cα− 2αδ − δ + δ2 − cδ;
and, Π(p∗1 | α > 0) equals to Π(p
∗
1 | α = 0), when α = 0.
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